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Abstract
What is the role of organizational factors in fostering regulatory reform in response to new technological development? Exis-
ting studies provide useful frameworks to understand regulatory reform in rapidly changing circumstances but still lack a sys-
tematic analysis of how organizational factors affect regulatory reform in the public sector. To fill this gap, we examine the
impact of several institutional elements that are central to defining organizational characteristics, such as job tasks, bureau-
cratic autonomy, and organizational culture. We theorize that regulatory reform is more likely when public sector organiza-
tions are more receptive to external changes, which are determined by these characteristics. We leverage original surveys from
over 1,000 civil servants in Korea, one of the front runners in new technological development, and find support for our predic-
tion. We find that the implementation of regulatory reforms is more likely when (i) organizational tasks are relevant to scien-
tific and technological development, (ii) higher levels of bureaucratic autonomy are granted, (iii) agency heads demonstrate
stronger leadership, and (iv) organizational culture is less authoritarian. Our study makes clear contributions to the literature
on public management and regulation theory, and has important implications for regulatory reform in the face of new techno-
logical development.
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1. Introduction
What fosters regulatory reform in the public sector in the era of new technological development? The relationship
between scientific and technological development and a government’s regulatory reform is an important subject,
but is not straightforward. As exemplified by the development of railway technology in the 1920s and the U.S.
government’s initially negative reactions to it (Zuckman et al. 1999), the relationship was once perceived as
inverse. However, many governments’ recent reforms seeking actively to keep pace with the development of
information and communication technology (ICT) call the negative view into question. Existing work in the dis-
ciplines of science and technology and social sciences inquires into the relationship between regulatory reform
and technological innovation (Irwin & Vergragt 1989; Epstein 1994; Blind 2012), and some evidence shows that
the government actively implements regulatory reforms to mitigate problems concerning information asymmetry
between stakeholders and citizens (Sabel et al. 2018). We recognize the existence of the recent phenomenon that
scientific and technological development positively affects the government’s regulatory reform efforts, and look
into the factors that facilitate its implementation in government agencies with the rise of new technologies.
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Existing studies make theoretical contributions to the literature by developing frameworks of regulatory
reform under rapidly changing circumstances (Irwin & Vergragt 1989; Epstein 1994; Boisson de Chazournes 2009;
Sabel et al. 2018). Given apparent changes in the external environment due to scientific and technological innova-
tions and their substantial effect on society, scholars have discussed the subject from various perspectives, ranging
from coevolution between innovation and regulation, law enactment and autonomy, to social consensus, and par-
ticipation.1 However, despite the critical role of organizational factors in shaping or constraining administrative
behavior, the literature still lacks a systematic analysis of how organizational factors affect regulatory reform in
the public sector in this context. To fill this gap in the literature, we examine several institutional components
that define organizational characteristics of government agencies, such as job tasks and organizational culture. To
explore how these aspects of public sector organizations affect regulatory reform in rapidly changing environ-
ments such as new technological development, we focus on the following factors: (i) organizational tasks relevant
to scientific and technological development, (ii) bureaucratic autonomy, (iii) public sector leadership, and (iv)
organizational culture. We predict that regulatory reforms are more likely to be implemented in conditions where
organizations are more receptive to external changes, which are determined by the four factors.
In analyzing the impact of organizational factors on regulatory reform, we leverage surveys of more than
1,000 national civil servants from government agencies in South Korea, one of the front runners in new techno-
logical development and one of the highest ranked countries in the world in the E-Government Development
Index. By employing the original data of recent surveys of civil servants actively working toward new technologi-
cal development, we can understand how institutional components that shape organizational characteristics affect
a government’s regulatory reform efforts in response to changes in the external environment. Our statistical anal-
ysis gives strong support to our argument. We find that the implementation of regulatory reforms is more likely
when (i) organizational tasks are relevant to scientific and technological development, (ii) higher levels of bureau-
cratic autonomy are granted, (iii) agency heads demonstrate stronger leadership, and (iv) organizational culture
is less authoritarian.
This study makes clear contributions to the literature on public management and regulation theory in the era
of new technological development. First, our study makes a theoretical contribution not only by distinguishing
public sector agencies dedicated to scientific and technological tasks from other agencies in regulatory reform but
also by highlighting central organizational characteristics, such as public leadership and organizational culture,
and their impact on regulatory reform. We believe that this is a timely approach in the context of new technolog-
ical development that has been neglected in past research on the theories of what causes regulatory reform. Sec-
ond and importantly, our study provides empirical evidence from a technologically developed society that
organizational factors do indeed play an important role in regulatory reform in the public sector. Although previ-
ous work contributes theoretical frameworks and underpinnings to the literature on regulatory reform
(Hahn 2000; May 2005; Helm 2006; Christensen et al. 2008), it has clear limitations: whether such models apply
and can be generalized to organizations in modern bureaucracies that are surrounded by the rise of new techno-
logical development has not been empirically tested. In this regard, our study offers significant policy implications
by indicating the nature of organizations that is conducive to regulatory reform in conditions of new technologi-
cal development.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
How to define regulatory reform has been debated in the literature. A broader concept of regulatory reform
involves strengthening market competition by minimizing government intervention, assuming that the govern-
ment and the market are basic principles that make up society (Lindblom 1977, pp. 3–13).2 On the other hand, a
narrower concept of regulatory reform views the essence of regulatory reform as a process of organizational
reduction that weakens bureaucratic authority (i.e. regulatory powers) and emphasizes the removal of govern-
ment restrictions (Mitnick 1980). Yet another view considers regulatory reform as not only the concept of less
regulation but also the process of managing regulation better (Baldwin 2005; Wiener 2006). This perspective
defines regulatory reform as the process of selecting an economic and effective means from among numerous policy
measures for improvement. In this study, building on this definition, we argue that regulatory reform in
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government agencies requires institutional reform from inside organizations, in order to remove restrictions or
enable this process of choosing an economic and effective means.
Regulatory reform itself can be explored from a variety of approaches. For example, one may focus on regula-
tory compliance among individuals and suggest the aspects related to governance systems, collaboration, and par-
ticipation as key factors affecting regulatory reform. Alternatively, one can consider regulation as part of public
policy and then study the impact of institutional factors on regulatory reform as policy reform (see Bardach &
Kagan 2002). According to theories in public policy, those factors selected as central in the implementation of
policy reform are clear policy objectives, rational policy content, the characteristics of bureaucracy (e.g. skilled
bureaucracy), support from leaders and stakeholders, and a stable policy environment (Sabatier & Mazmanian,
1979). From this discussion, in this article, we consider several organizational factors, such as organizational cul-
ture and tasks, to understand their impact on the implementation of regulatory reform.
Examining the influence of institutional aspects of organizational factors, our approach leverages their varia-
tion across different agency units, as we see such impact vary across organizations within the whole body of cen-
tral government. In the next section, as we discuss regulatory reform in the context of new technological
development, we first examine whether government agencies dedicated to scientific and technological tasks are
more open to regulatory reform. Then, we look further into other organizational factors, namely bureaucratic
autonomy, public sector leadership, and organizational culture, to understand their effects on the implementation
of regulatory reform.
2.1. Task characteristics and regulatory reform
Regulations are fundamentally characterized as the “intentional intervention of target groups” (Mitnick 1980;
Meier 1985; Baldwin & Cave 1999) to achieve policy goals. In order to achieve people’s well-being and sustainable
economic growth by preventing or resolving various risks, such as financial crisis and environmental disasters,
the government designs and implements regulatory policies in many ways, including supervision and deregula-
tion through cooperation with regulated entities. How government agencies respond to situations they face differs
according to the nature of their organizational tasks. For example, the emergence of new technologies, such as
artificial intelligence (AI),3 causes multiple different agencies that previously seemed unrelated to each other to
work together to address in an interdisciplinary manner new social problems concerning the legal status of
robots, as well as corruption and tax evasion involving virtual currencies, and issues of protecting personal infor-
mation in blockchain medical records. Since uncertainty coming from the development of science and technology
results in ripple effects that are hard to predict in advance, the government will implement regulations to limit
their potentially negative effects on society as a whole.
Interdisciplinary research in social sciences that studies science and technology inquires whether innovation
generated by the rise of new technology conflicts with existing regulations (Irwin & Vergragt 1989; Epstein 1994;
Blind 2012; Asquer & Krachkovskaya n.d., forthcoming; Howlett et al. n.d., forthcoming; Whitford & Ander-
son 2019). With increasing uncertainties due to such innovation, the government is often encouraged to actively
enforce regulations to mitigate problems concerning the safety of the people, created by information asymmetry
between suppliers and consumers (Sabel et al. 2018, p. 372). In this regard, science and technology regulations,
regardless of their orientation, can be seen as belonging to a general category of regulation policy. Like regulation
of other sectors, science and technology regulations have the characteristics of monitoring and punishment based
on standard rules, which may restrict the impact of innovation. In particular, the government tries to establish
regulations to prevent legitimacy risks caused by innovation,4 and each government agency tends to use powerful
sanctions to ensure that existing regulatory policies strengthen its legitimacy. This point has been noted by past
research: according to the external signals model (Olson 1996, pp. 377–378), regulatory bodies attempt to mini-
mize people’s negative feedback by sending a signal of strong sanctions to them, because regulatory failures and
their negative feedback may undermine regulatory bodies’ autonomy and lead to intervention from the legislature
or other outside authorities. In addition, new risks arising from scientific and technological development are
arguably underestimated, because they are inherently difficult to substantiate, and thus require the application of
the “precautionary principle” (Boisson de Chazournes 2009, pp. 191–194). Therefore, active regulatory reform in
government agencies is not likely until the risks created by new technologies become fully tangible.
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However, despite these restrictions, rapid progress in science and technology can also make a positive impact
by changing the conventional industrial structure and the regulatory environment. For example, as multinational
companies become more pervasive and countries establish common technology standards among them, the emer-
gence of new communication infrastructures like the Internet makes access to knowledge more convenient and
innovation becomes more globalized (Negoita 2014, p. 372). Yet, under these conditions, regulatory environments
are too complex and uncertain to control, which requires a different approach. In these circumstances, regulatory
agencies that deal with scientific and technological tasks need to contemplate whether to strengthen ex ante regu-
lations or reform inappropriate regulations. The rapid development of science and technology makes it difficult
to design regulations that uniformly apply to various industries, but regulators still have to identify potential risks
and set the standards that companies will abide by.
Of course, accurately predicting future risks and preparing corresponding response systems are daunting tasks
even for policy experts in government agencies. However, increasing uncertainty, ironically, may induce regula-
tory reform by encouraging cooperation between regulators and regulated agents. Facing growing pressures from
changes in external environments and needing to address such challenges, regulators handling science and tech-
nology policies will need to work with regulated bodies in identifying and containing high risks, which may lead
to wide-ranging regulatory reform that covers various sectors in science and technology. For example, mutual
cooperation between regulating agencies and regulated bodies, enabling preemptive and proactive activities as
well as experimental attempts at technological advancement, has resulted in the implementation of regulatory
reform systems, such as RegTech and a regulatory sandbox. Consequently, well-designed regulations promote
companies’ investment in innovation activities and processes and their launch of innovative products (Porter &
van der Linder 1995, pp. 99–100); and the flexible use of regulatory instruments helps to enhance economic wel-
fare and growth (Majumdar & Marcus 2001, p. 171). In sum, from this discussion, we predict that government
agencies related to science and technology policies will more actively carry out regulatory reform than other
agencies.
Hypothesis 1. Agencies that handle science and technology policies are more likely to implement regulatory
reform than other agencies.
2.2. Bureaucratic autonomy and regulatory reform
Can the bureaucracy be autonomous; and is it desirable for the bureaucracy to be autonomous? These questions
have been debated for a long time. While the Madisonians make it clear that bureaucratic latitude should not be
recognized under strict legalism (Lowi 1979), the Hamiltonians point out that bureaucratic latitude is necessary
for an effective and practically functioning government (Goodsell 1981, 1985). In general, bureaucratic autonomy
can be understood through two different approaches. First, from the principal-agent framework, bureaucratic
autonomy means the extent to which government agencies may implement policies that deviate from a higher
institution’s preference. In this view, bureaucratic autonomy concerns agencies’ decision-making abilities in
implementation (Meier 1980, 1985; Hammond & Knott 1996, 1999; Verhoest et al. 2004; Verschuere 2007). Sec-
ond, bureaucratic autonomy not only means managerial autonomy related to institutional operations, such as
human resource and financial management but also includes policy autonomy that allows for agents’ selection of
appropriate policy measures (Roness et al. 2008, p. 161; Ege 2017).
Then, what is the expected relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and regulatory reform? In the past,
efficient organizations were perceived to meet the two conditions – (i) highly integrated, hierarchical structures
and command systems and (ii) strict rules and procedures to regulate organizations.5 However, this perception is
only valid in simple and stable environments, where organizations are able to respond quickly to environmental
changes (Roness et al. 2008, p. 158). When policy environments are more complex and changing rapidly, as in
the case of the development of technology, processes within organizations must have sufficient discretion and
autonomy for the bureaucracy to respond to these external changes (Roness et al. 2008). A strictly controlled
organization rather has (i) low authority to respond flexibly to environmental changes and (ii) a large amount of
information funneled toward the organization’s decision-makers, such that information overload will instead
delay the decision-making (Roness et al. 2008, p. 158). Inversely, an organization with high discretion and
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flexibility will be able to respond adequately to environmental changes, in order to select the best decision-making
process and policy measures and to attain the organizational goals and policy objectives.
Therefore, greater bureaucratic autonomy results in a greater possibility of improving regulations that do not
match the environmental changes. In improving through the implementation of regulatory reform, both official
and unofficial procedures are involved. Often, public organizations prepare standard operation procedures (SOPs)
or manuals for this reform, but discretion is more likely to occur at the actual implementation stage. Particularly in
the field of science and technology that experiences rapid changes, excessive formalization in the politico-economic
regulatory environment rather hampers flexible operations and timely responses to external changes; on the other
hand, unofficial administrative activities, which are flexibly applied according to situations and the characteristics
of targets, help more easily to obtain compliance from the regulated entities. In brief, we expect that, in the condi-
tions where bureaucratic autonomy is greater and agencies have more room for informal operations, regulatory
reform will more actively occur.
Hypothesis 2. Agencies that are more autonomous are more likely to implement regulatory reform than less
autonomous agencies.
2.3. Public leadership and regulatory reform
Leadership is presented as a key factor of organizational management in numerous studies and as a success factor
in achieving policy goals (Pressman & Wildavsky 1984; Meier 1985; Rainey & Steinbauer 1999; Choudhary et
al. 2013; Subramony et al. 2018). Studies related to regulatory reform also consider leadership to be a critical fac-
tor (OECD 1998; Christensen et al. 2008). While regulatory reform may be carried out according to the convic-
tions or goals of top-level policy makers, most regulatory reform in the field of science and technology occurs
due to innovation from technological development and the need for a new regulatory environment. Leadership
plays a pivotal role in handling the latter situations: not all innovation leads to regulatory reform, and leaders
consider what and how to reform carefully in a given sociopolitical context (van Buuren & Loorback 2009, p.
382). Moreover, since regulatory reform processes may provoke strong opposition from various stakeholders, as
they can reduce the “increasing returns” that companies and interest groups in the system have enjoyed and
further change the regime’s income redistribution (North 1990, p. 99), leadership should be one of the most
important factors in handling the implementation of regulatory reform (OECD 1998). Specifically in science
and technology policy sectors, public organizations often encounter difficulties in predicting the degree and
direction of technological changes; it is the leaders’ role that matters in making decisions that can optimize
problem-solving and in establishing a necessary policy in advance. With insufficient information and bounded
rationality under rapidly changing circumstances, leaders’ ability to simplify complex situations through focusing
on the most important issues, and their problem-solving, is what every organization needs (Cyert & March 1963;
Simon 1978).
The innovative behavior of leaders – that is much needed in the dynamic environments surrounding the sci-
ence and technology sectors – can be clearly described through the ambidextrous leadership theory. This leader-
ship theory emphasizes a leader’s capacity to utilize existing knowledge and tools for successful organizational or
institutional reform and to effectively explore alternative solutions for the future.6 Existing studies also find that
ambidextrous leadership facilitates innovative actions in the organization (Rosing et al. 2011; Zacher &
Wilden 2014; Zacher & Rosing 2015). At the core of ambidextrous leadership theory is the ability to perform var-
ious leadership roles according to internal and external needs, since various tensions and contradictions may
appear in the process of innovating within the organization in response to complex external environments. With
regard to regulatory reform, the innovative behavior of a leader can be regarded as a series of processes to create,
select, and implement advanced technology and appropriate systems for the proliferation of new technology
(Scott & Bruce 1994). For successful regulatory reform in response to the development of new technologies,
therefore, the manifestation of such leadership behavior is necessary. This discussion leads to our third
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 3. The stronger agency heads’ leadership is, the more actively regulatory reform will take place in
the agencies.
2.4. Organizational culture and regulatory reform
Administrative style, which is a collection of institutionalized patterns regarding the politics-administration rela-
tionship, norms, and procedures established over a long period of time (Howlett 2004, p. 15), attracts much
attention as a factor affecting the performance of administrative reform (Knill 1999). It is closely related to orga-
nizational culture as they play a similar role in organizational context.7 As a source of the behavior of organiza-
tional constituents that covers shared values, beliefs, norms, and consciousness, organizational culture becomes
its control system when policy makers explore possible alternatives and choose policy tools (Deal & Ken-
nedy 1983). The question is, what aspects of organizational culture stimulate or discourage administrative reform
efforts in the organization?
According to research on the forms of organizational culture (Allaire & Firsirotu 1984; Denison &
Spreitzer 1991; Denison & Mishra 1995; van van Muijen & Turnipseed 1999; Hogan & Coote 2014), external con-
straints posed by organizational culture can be classified into (i) individual constraints that determine each con-
stituent’s behavior and (ii) structural constraints that determine the behavior of individual constituents or that of
organizations. The former is divided further into individualism and collectivism, whereas the latter can be split
into authoritarianism and democracy. For the sake of our discussion, we extend the latter point, particularly on
authoritarian culture.
Authoritarian culture emphasizes organizational control and internal orientation, and this type of culture
exhibits the characteristics of norms and values related to bureaucratism. It is also closely related to the hierarchi-
cal structure of authority within organizations: the more hierarchical the structure is, the larger the vertical
authority gaps between individuals or sub-units (Fry 1982). Authoritarian culture has the characteristics of rigid
attitudes among employees and nonparticipatory policy decision-making (Hofstede 1984). Consequently, bureau-
crats in authoritarian organizational culture may behave passively, show a psychological sense of helplessness,
and exhibit self-centered and opportunistic attitudes toward given tasks.
Organizational constituents who feel alienated from authoritarian culture also express low satisfaction and
show negative behavior, such as rejecting participation in change, delaying work, and increasing resistance
(Ashforth & Lee 1990; Coghlan 1993; Ford 1996). When organizational constituents become discontented with
their organizational culture, a desire for defense arises naturally in response to the losses that they suffer due to
changes (Coghlan 1993; Ford 1996). Defensive behavioral patterns take the forms of immobility and avoidance of
blame (Ashforth & Lee 1990), which negatively affect the organization, and they become one of the most signifi-
cant causes of decreased effectiveness when the organization needs regulatory reform: it is difficult to motivate
constituents with a strong avoidance disposition which dampens expectations for any change in organizational
behavior or achievements. In addition, bureaucrats’ tendency to protect their domain concerning regulatory
changes or their resistance to change itself (i.e. the “Regulatory Ratchet”) can also be considered as a defensive
psychological constraint (Bardach & Kagan 2002). Therefore, our last hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4. More authoritarian organizational culture will lead to less implementation of regulatory
reform.
3. Survey design and data
In order to test our hypotheses, we constructed an original dataset through a national civil servant survey con-
ducted in South Korea between 2016 and 2017. South Korea is a particularly interesting case for studying regula-
tory reform in the context of new technological development, not only because its government is ranked as one
of the highest in the E-Government Development Index but also because its civil service corps is ranked as one
of the most effective globally (Lee 2018; Lee 2020; Lee & Schuler 2020).8 The recruitment and promotion of its
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civil servants are merit-based, whereby most of them enter the civil service through competitive centralized exam-
inations at grades 9, 7, and 5 (low-high), respectively, and they are promoted through a rule-bound system.
Our survey data come from 29 central government agencies, and the sampled agencies are representative of
South Korean national agencies in terms of demographics (see Table A1 for the list of government agencies
included in our study). Our surveys were administered by Hankook Research, one of the largest survey research
firms in South Korea.9 The surveys were distributed to civil servants based on a stratified sampling method to
ensure that respondents across agencies represented a similar mix of civil service ranks, recruitment type, and
gender. The sampling method also aimed to obtain a certain number of respondents proportional to the size of
each agency unit. The surveys were assigned to civil servant respondents at their workplace and completed in pri-
vate. No personally identifying information was obtained.10
In total, 1,010 surveys were completed, and the nonresponse rate of our survey was less than 10%. Table 1
shows the characteristics of the respondents: an education level of 0 = completion of community college (or
lower), 1 = completion of college (4-year program), and 2 = completion of graduate school (MA or PhD); a civil
service rank of 0 = grade 9 (lowest), 1 = grade 8, 2 = grade 7, 3 = grade 6, 4 = grade 5, 5 = grade 4, and 6 = senior
civil servant (highest); a civil service job category of 0 = technical and 1 = administrative; and a recruitment type
of 0 = open recruitment and 1 = centralized civil service examination. Figure A1 graphically shows the distribu-
tion of respondents by each of these characteristics.
Of the 1,010 completed surveys, 760 (75.2%) of the respondents are 47 years old or younger, 326 (32.3%) are
female, 733 (72.6%) hold a BA (4-year program) or a higher degree, 863 (85.4%) are from grade 5 or lower, and
734 (72.7%) have no private sector experience before entering the civil service. Table 1 also presents the descrip-
tive statistics of our variables introduced below.
4. Statistical modeling and empirical findings
In this section, to test our hypotheses through statistical analysis of our original survey data, we first introduce
our dependent, independent, and control variables. The main dependent variable, regulatory reform, is a measure
of the likelihood of implementing regulatory reform at the organizational level. The dichotomous variable is a
civil servant’s response to the following survey question: “Has your organization implemented any regulatory
Table 1 Characteristics of civil servant respondents and descriptive statistics of variables
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Characteristics
Age (years) 40.54 8.23 19 59
Female (%) 0.32 0.47 0 1
Education 0.78 0.53 0 2
Civil service rank 3.36 1.18 0 6
Civil service job category 0.73 0.45 0 1
Recruitment type 0.81 0.39 0 1
Private sector experience (years) 1.18 2.92 0 30
Professionalism 3.27 0.83 1 5
Dependent variable
Regulatory reform 0.361 0.481 0 1
Independent variable
Science and technology sector 0.458 0.498 0 1
Bureaucratic autonomy 3.192 0.809 1 5
Agency head leadership −0.092 0.930 −2.430 1.661
Authoritarian culture −0.002 0.885 −3.614 1.755
Control variable
Staff size (log) 7.608 1.245 5.513 10.404
Budget size (log) 10.230 2.107 5.746 13.233
Agency head’s political ideology 0.110 0.314 0 1
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reform in the last three years?” In the survey, this question was detailed with a clear definition of the implementa-
tion of regulatory reform as “choosing an economic and effective means – either new or updated – from among
numerous policy measures for improvement of the agency’s regulatory function” (Baldwin 2005; Wiener 2006).
We have four key independent variables for each of our hypotheses. First, as a measure of the science & tech-
nology sector, we use a dichotomous variable that classifies whether civil servants are from agencies related to
new technological development and actually handle science and technology policies. Following the 2016 Guideline
of Performance Management and Evaluation in Public Services issued by the Office for Government Policy Coor-
dination under the Office of the Prime Minister in South Korea,11 we classify the 11 agencies listed in Table 2
into the science and technology policy sector group.
Second, bureaucratic autonomy is the level of discretion that civil servants can enjoy in policy implementation
in a given organization. To estimate this measure, we use civil servants’ answers to the following question: “High
levels of autonomy are granted in implementing policies in your organization.” The answer is recorded on a five-
point scale, ranging from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1).
Third, agency head leadership is a measure of civil servants’ assessment of their agency heads’ leadership in
three dimensions: policy expertise, organizational management abilities, and skills in coordination with other bra-
nches. We construct the measure from answers to three questions on each of the three dimensions on a five-point
scale by developing a measurement model, where a general approach of factor analysis is adopted to generate a
continuous variable. Higher values on this measure indicate higher levels of leadership capacity. Table 3 displays
the path coefficients and means in the measurement model. We test the correlation between the single questions
and the construct, which falls between 0.587 and 0.946. In brief, the scale properties of our construct show
acceptable validity and reliability.
Fourth, authoritarian culture measures the degree of authoritarianism in the civil service organizations’ cul-
ture. We construct the measure from answers to two questions that capture two main features of authoritarian
culture: (i) whether organizations are hierarchically structured so that norms and values related to bureaucratism
are perceived as important; and (ii) whether organizations regularly monitor and control their employees
(Fry 1982).12 They were asked both on a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree”
(5). Higher values on this measure indicate higher degrees of authoritarianism. Table 4 displays the path coeffi-
cients and means in the measurement model. We test the correlation between the single questions and the
Table 2 Eleven agencies in the science and technology policy sector
Agency Relevance
Ministry of Science and Technology Main policy area
Ministry of Education Science and technology education
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Fourth industrial revolution area (biological section)
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy Fourth industrial revolution area (physical section)
Ministry of Health and Welfare Biotechnology
Ministry of Environment Nanotechnology
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries Biotechnology
Public Procurement Service Autonomous vehicles and other equipment
Small and Medium Business Administration Fourth industrial revolution area (physical section)
Korea Fair Trade Commission Fourth industrial revolution area
Financial Services Commission Fourth industrial revolution area
Office for Government Policy Coordination under the Office of the Prime Minister.
Table 3 Survey items for the leadership construct and its measurement model
Item Path coefficient Mean
Policy expertise 0.880 3.41
Organizational management abilities 0.729 3.32
Skills in coordination with other branches 0.805 3.45
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construct, which falls between 0.643 and 0.906. Therefore, the scale properties of our construct display acceptable
validity and reliability.
In addition, we control for eight individual and three organizational factors that may affect the likelihood of
an agency’s implementation of regulatory reform. Besides the seven demographic and civil service characteristics
of the respondents described above, we control for bureaucrats’ professionalism. Since the effect of bureaucratic
autonomy may be conditional on the underlying preferences of bureaucrats in implementation (Teodoro, 2011;
Miller & Whitford, 2016), we include in our models civil servant respondents’ answer to the question “I know
what I am expected to do in my organization.” The question was asked on a five-point scale, ranging from
“strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1).
Further, we also include three organizational variables: the size of the budget and staff in a given agency and
the political ideology of agency heads. The size of the budget and staff can affect the agency’s capacity to imple-
ment policy reform. Our budget and staff data come from the National Assembly Budget Office and the Ministry
of Personnel Management, respectively.13 Regarding the political ideology of agency heads (1 if agency heads are
from the ruling party, and 0 otherwise), we control for this variable, as the effect of their leadership can be condi-
tional on their ideology or their relationship with lawmakers (Weingast & Moran 1983; Meier 1985; Lee &
Park 2020).
5. Results
Table 5 presents the results of our analysis. Models 1 and 2 test the proposed hypotheses with control variables
only included in Model 2. The results lend strong support to our hypotheses by confirming the predicted rela-
tionships between the implementation of regulatory reform and each of the four independent variables con-
cerning organizational characteristics. To estimate the likelihood of implementation of regulatory reform, given
that our dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression models with robust standard errors clus-
tered on each agency. All our models include agency fixed effects. Specific results are discussed below.
First, the coefficient of the science & technology sector is positive and statistically significant. Based on the esti-
mation of Model 2, agencies related to new technological development are more likely to conduct regulatory
reforms by 14.3 percentage points, holding all other variables constant at their means. The substantive effect is
graphically shown in Figure 1. This finding confirms our first hypothesis, suggesting that agencies that handle sci-
ence and technology policies are indeed more likely to implement regulatory reform than other agencies in the
context of new technological development.
While such development facilitates access to knowledge and innovations in the public sector (Negoita 2014),
agencies that closely handle science and technology issues are more keen to make regulatory reform efforts, for
practical reasons. Consider the creation of the New Industry Regulatory Innovation Committee in South Korea.
When President Moon Jae-in took office in May 2017, one of his primary policy initiatives was to push for regu-
latory reform in new industry sectors needed for economic development, such as ICT fusion, energy and new
materials, and bio-health.14 We find that such industries largely overlap the science and technology policy areas
listed in Table 2.
Second, the coefficient of bureaucratic autonomy is positive and statistically significant. Based on the estima-
tion of Model 2, organizations with highest observed levels of autonomy are more likely to implement regulatory
reform than those with lowest observed levels of autonomy by 11 percentage points. We graphically present its
substantive effect in Figure 1. This finding confirms our second hypothesis. Consistent with previous research, we
find that bureaucratic organizations with more autonomy tend to respond more actively to external
Table 4 Survey items for the authoritarianism construct and its measurement model
Item Path coefficient Mean
Hierarchical structure and norms and values related to bureaucratism 0.802 3.78
Regularly monitoring and controlling employees 0.801 3.61
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environmental changes, such as new technological development, and suspect that this effect is mainly due to their
flexibility and decentralized decision-making structure (Roness et al. 2008).
Third, the coefficient of agency head leadership is also positive and statistically significant in Table 5. Based
on the estimation of Model 2, an increase in agency head leadership from its observed minimum to maximum
values leads to an increased likelihood of implementing regulatory reform by 11.8 percentage points, holding all
others constant. we visualize its substantive effect in Figure 1. Overall, this finding confirms our third hypothesis.
Consistent with past work on the role of leadership in regulatory reform under conditions of technological inno-
vation (Zacher & Wilden 2014; Zacher & Rosing 2015), this finding suggests that leadership indeed plays a
Table 5 Logistic analysis: estimations of regulatory reform
Model 1 Model 2
Est. SE Est. SE
Independent variable
Science and technology sector 1.802*** (0.026) 1.516*** (0.072)
Bureaucratic autonomy 0.209** (0.095) 0.199** (0.097)
Agency head leadership 0.147* (0.077) 0.158* (0.080)





Civil service rank 0.367*** (0.114)
Civil service job category 0.293 (0.185)
Recruitment type 0.440 (0.321)
Private sector experience 0.044 (0.031)
Professionalism 0.216* (0.111)
Staff size (log) −0.793*** (0.143)
Budget size (log) 0.285*** (0.072)
Political ideology −1.530*** (0.489)
Constant −0.930*** 0.143 −0.093 (0.857)
N 1,010 1,010
***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include agency fixed effects.
Figure 1 Estimated effects of the four independent variables on the likelihood of implementation of regulatory reform. Esti-
mations are based on Model 2 in Table 5, and control variables are not presented. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are
shown.
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central role in inducing innovative actions in such organization. Consider Oh Myung, the former Minister of Sci-
ence and Technology in South Korea, as a case where reform initiatives by leaders who are experts in the field
can lead to high performance in public sector agencies. During Oh’s tenure as a science and technology minister,
his reform initiatives drew substantial support from major electronics companies, including Samsung and LG,
and thanks to his leadership, the ministry successfully carried out necessary regulatory reforms.15
Finally, the coefficient of authoritarian culture is negative and statistically significant. Based on the estimation
of Model 2, organizations with most authoritarian culture are less likely to implement regulatory reform than
those with least authoritarian culture by 52 percentage points. Its substantive effect is clearly shown in Figure 1.
Therefore, this finding confirms our fourth hypothesis. Indeed, organizational culture does affect agencies’ regula-
tory reform efforts (Knill 1999) and is likely to shape how organizations respond to important changes in exter-
nal settings, such as new technological development. Authoritarian organizational culture means more centralized
control and less flexibility in policy implementation. Consequently, as expected, facing new technological develop-
ment, regulatory reform is less likely to be implemented in organizations with a more hierarchical and rigid
culture.
Some of our control variables attain statistical significance. It is notable that both higher civil service ranks
and higher levels of bureaucrats’ professionalism are positively associated with the likelihood of implementing
regulatory reform. The finding about bureaucrats’ professionalism is particularly in line with past work on civil
servants’ professionalism (Miller & Whiford, 2016; Lee & Park n.d., forthcoming). We also find that organiza-
tions’ budget size helps implementation of regulatory reform, but their staff size has a negative impact on regula-
tory reform. We believe that, while organizational financial capacity has a positive impact on regulatory reform,
too big a staff size may hamper such reform. In addition, we find the significant but negative effect of agency
heads’ political ideology (i.e. belonging to the conservative ruling party) on regulatory reform. While this finding
itself is interesting, it requires further investigation to distinguish whether the effect comes from their ideology or
their relationship with the ruling party.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we aimed to broaden our understanding of the factors that foster regulatory reform in the era of
new technological development by focusing on the role of organizational factors in the public sector. Specifically,
we examine the institutional aspects of public sector organizations that are central to defining organizational
characteristics, such as task characteristics, bureaucratic autonomy, public sector leadership, and organizational
culture. We test whether regulatory reform is more likely to be implemented in conditions where organizational
features are more receptive to external environmental changes, which, we argue, is determined by a set of these
organizational factors. We analyze original survey data from more than 1,000 national civil servants in South
Korea, one of the front runners in new technological development. Our analysis strongly supports our predic-
tions: regulatory reform is more likely to be implemented when (i) organizations’ tasks are closely related to sci-
ence and technology policies and new technological development, (ii) higher levels of discretion are granted in
policy implementation, (iii) agency heads demonstrate stronger leadership capacity, and (iv) organizational cul-
ture is less authoritarian.
Our study makes clear contributions to the literature on public management and regulation theory, and has
important implications for regulatory reform in response to new technological development. Given the central
role of institutions in rapidly changing environments, our analysis shows clear evidence that institutional ele-
ments, such as bureaucratic autonomy and organizational culture, play no less important a role in facilitating or
hindering regulatory reform in the face of critical external changes. While future studies should aim to continue
studying other important but less examined organizational characteristics, such as public service integrity and
shared missions, our study takes a meaningful step toward surveying the role of organizational factors in regula-
tory reform under conditions of new technological development.
Although our study contributes to the literature by empirically testing with original data the theories and
models from past work on regulatory reform, it is not without limitations. Our measure of the implementation of
regulatory reform relies on the perception of national civil servants in South Korea. South Korea’s bureaucrats
are from highly professionalized systems: they are recruited through competitive examination and trained and
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promoted by merit-based rules. Therefore, their assessment of policy implementation for which they are directly
responsible should have much higher validity and reliability than assessment from the perspective of citizens
(Andrews et al. 2006). Still, human memory and knowledge themselves are imperfect. Therefore, further research
on this subject needs to be conducted with an analysis of data from objective indexes recording the frequency of
the regulatory reforms implemented in each agency, in order to complement the findings of this study.
There are a number of areas where future research can seek to help our understanding of regulatory reform
in new technological development. One area is the development of a more unifying theoretical framework that
would underpin the role of organizational factors in explaining the implementation of regulatory reform. In this
study, we proposed and tested the impact of several organizational factors by putting together various disparate
concepts from the literature on regulation theories. Yet, what the overarching framework forming the basis of
these factors may be, and how these factors cooperate in facilitating the implementation of regulatory reform, are
still largely unknown. The results from our additional statistical analysis in Table A2 suggest that each of the four
organizational factors discussed in this study seems sufficient to induce regulatory reform without others being
present concurrently.16 In addition, some of the variables used simply as controls in our analysis, such as bureau-
crats’ professionalism, need further investigation in future research on regulatory reform in new technological
development. In this study, we mainly focused on organizational behavior in explaining each agency’s response
to new technological development, but as recent studies show (Teodoro, 2011; Miller & Whitford, 2016), the
behavior of individual bureaucrats related to their professionalism and ambition should not be less important for
successful implementation of regulatory reforms, particularly in rapidly changing external circumstances.
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Endnotes
1 For example, Irwin and Vergragt (1989) suggest social and institutional negotiations as a useful approach and discuss the
specific characteristics and relationships of regulation and innovation. Boisson de Chazournes (2009) stresses the need for
a precautionary principle and participation under external changes.
2 According to this broader concept, regulatory reform does not simply mean removing government intervention, but also
emphasizes appropriate functional harmony between the government and the market imposing on firms’ social responsi-
bility concerning environmental pollution, healthcare, and public safety (Mitnick 1980, p. 418).
3 Such technology combines biotechnology, brain engineering, and computer technology; virtual currency; and healthcare
using blockchain technology.
4 Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 571). Legitimacy in
regulation policies can be a perception that regulations (or regulatory reforms) are desirable; that is, a belief that the origi-
nal purpose of the government is to safeguard people from unexpected danger through regulations (reform). The legiti-
macy of an organization or that of a policy strengthens the stability and cohesion of the organization and is essential for
the acquisition of organizational resources such as budgets, labor, and outside monitoring. It is important for organiza-
tions to secure legitimacy (Suchman 1995. pp. 574–575), because illegitimacy leaves them vulnerable to claims that they
are negligent, irrational, or unnecessary (Suchman 1995, p. 575).
5 The main purpose of these regulations was to ensure fairness to citizens and to discourage discriminatory policies.
6 According to this theory, interaction between opening and closing leader behaviors is a key driver of successful reform:
opening behavior encourages organizational constituents to work in diverse circumstances and practice exploration activi-
ties to try out new ideas, whereas closing behavior presents clear standards and work regulations to organizational constit-
uents, and promotes management activities such as the establishment of work procedures and performance monitoring.
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7 Administrative style includes the relationship between the government and the internal norms and procedures of the
organization. Although administrative style and organizational culture are conceptually not the same, they both become
external constraints to organizational constituents. Since we discuss their role mainly in relation to organizational context,
we will use them interchangeably.
8 In 2018, South Korea was ranked third in the E-Government Development Index and first in the E–Participation Index
(https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-un-e-government-survey.html, accessed 10 September 2019).
9 https://www.hrc.co.kr/eng/. Survey samples collected by Hankook Research have been widely used in social science
research.
10 The human research subjects aspect of our research protocol was approved by our university’s Institutional Review Board.
11 http://www.evaluation.go.kr/mobile/user/mobileBoardDetail.do?boardCode=psec_eva&boardSeq=220 (last accessed 2 April
2019).
12 A continuous variable is created based on our measurement model, which adopts a general approach of factor analysis.
13 Sources: http://www.openfiscaldata.go.kr/portal/service/mainFinanceStat1Page.do (budget); http://www.mpm.go.kr/mpm/
lawStat/infoStatistics/hrStatistics/statisticsAnnual/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000037&mode=view&cntId=853&category=&
pageIdx= (staff) (accessed 5 April 2019).
14 http://biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2018/01/22/2018012201120.html (accessed April 10, 2019).
15 http://www.2000news.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=11949 (accessed 14 April 2019).
16 In Appendix Table A2, we re-run the analysis with each of our four independent variables in separate models, controlling
for the same individual and organizational variables included in our original Model 2 of Table 5. We find that the four
independent variables in four different models are statistically significant and conform to our predicted directions.
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